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SUMMARY
The article discusses governance structure and stakeholder involvement in pension plan reforms. Although the global ﬁnancial
crisis has put pressure on pension reforms, some reforms were implemented earlier because of sustainability issues that had
emerged on the basis of, among other issues, demographic trends. We show, based on Dutch experiences, that stakeholders
and individual participants in particular were only partially involved in these changes. On the basis of these ﬁndings, we propose
some tools to improve stakeholder involvement, which can contribute to sustainable support from stakeholders to pension plans.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
In this article, we examine governance structures and stakeholder involvement in pension reform in OECD-countries
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. It has been suggested that pension reforms are
one of the many responses to the ﬁnancial crisis. However, although they did not receive much attention at the time,
several changes in pension systems were already implemented before the Global Financial Crisis having a structural
impact on pension plans for the coming decades. When the ﬁnancial crisis severely affected the funding ratios,
stakeholders became aware of a mismatch between their expectations of solid pension plans and the actual possibilities
those pension plans could realize. In many countries, this resulted in stakeholder interest groups expressing their
concerns and governments pressuring pension plans to improve their governance and communication and involvement
with stakeholders.
Has this stakeholder involvement become reality? We argue that even in a country like the Netherlands – known
for its Poldermodel in which stakeholders are always involved in decision-making processes – the actualization,
until now, has been very limited.
In the following section, we present some preliminary remarks about pension systems in OECD countries. In
The Essence of Stakeholder Analysis, we provide the essence of stakeholder analysis found in the literature and
apply this to the world of pension plans. We follow this with a case study on the problems that emerged in one
speciﬁc OECD country – the Netherlands – and the resulting changes in its pension system (The Three Pillar
Pension System in the Netherlands and its Problems). We conclude with suggestions for changing the
governance structure of the pension system and some guidance for other countries that are considering setting
up second-pillar plans.
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SOME REMARKS ON PENSION SYSTEMS WORLDWIDE
Based on studies by the World Bank, the analysis of pension systems is based on the ﬁve pillar model, developed by
Holzman and Hinz (2005). A detailed analysis of the ﬁve pillar system is discussed in another article in this special issue.
Our remarks focus on the ﬁrst-pillar and second-pillar plans. In general, a ﬁrst-pillar plan is a government-controlled plan
funded on a PAYGO basis. Second-pillar plans are compulsory and (fully) funded but need not be controlled by govern-
ment. In the remainder of this article, we will consider pension plans to be ‘private’when more than a third of the aggre-
gated ﬁrst-pillar and second-pillar retirement income is generated from privately run pension plans (OECD, 2013: 159).
Since 2009, two institutions have been assessing international trends in pension systems systematically, namely, the
OECD and Mercer.1 Whereas the OECD focuses on quantitative analysis and qualitative assessment of pension
systems in member states and some other major economies, Mercer provides a more qualitative analysis based on
the adequacy, sustainability and integrity of the system. Mercer’s analysis is based on a standard set of some 50 ques-
tions posed to consultants in the countries studied, in a way that allows for objective assessment (Mercer, 2013: 13).
The OECD dataset consists of 42 countries. Mercer covers 20 countries, 19 of which are also covered in the OECD
study. The countries that are exclusively studied in the OECD report include 17 countries with fully public ﬁrst-pillar
and second-pillar pension systems. Four countries have pension systems with more than half of weighted pension
income generated from public resources, and the last two countries have a strong bias towards weighted pension
income from private sources. The Mercer and OECD lists include countries normally deﬁned as emerging markets.
Both reports also include both deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) pension systems.
Both OECD and Mercer essentially cover mandatory ﬁrst-pillar and second-pillar systems, leaving out the non-
mandatory third pillar as well as pillars 0 and 4. We have used the two most recent publications of Mercer (2013)
and OECD (2013) to provide an overview of the quality of pension systems in the countries studied. The OECD
study provides information on the composition of weighted average pension wealth in a country for the mandatory
parts of the system. These data were used to qualify a country’s pension system as public leaning or private leaning.
The Mercer study generates the Global Pension Index (GPI), which is the weighted score on all questions in the
study. This score is further divided into three sub-scores: (1) adequacy refers to the level of beneﬁts provided;
(2) long-term quality refers to the sustainability of the system; and (3) integrity covers governance issues. Table 1
provides the average scores on the Mercer Global Pension Index and its sub-indices for the 19 countries that
are included in both studies. Scores range from 0 to 100. Mercer comments that differences in scores below
2.0 do not suggest substantially better pension systems. When the difference in scores is 5.0 or more, this is
an indication of meaningful variations in the pension system (Mercer, 2013: 7).
The overall ﬁnding is that Mercer assesses countries with a bias towards private systems as substantially better
systems based on all three main perspectives (Mercer, 2013: 7). Even if the private DB systems were excluded, coun-
tries with pension systems that lean toward private provision of weighted pension income have higher scores than
countries with purely public pension systems. Theoretically and from a governance perspective, a DC system allows
for more direct participant inﬂuence because it enables investment policies based on individual preferences. Except for
the Danish case, all DC systems mentioned earlier are basically individual systems. The two main disadvantages of
such systems are the higher costs and conversion problems at retirement (Bodie and Prast, 2007; Tretiakova
and Yamada, 2011; Mercer, 2013: 13). A DB system requires another setup. If not, the guarantee of a certain
income at retirement cannot be met. Therefore, participants’ involvement cannot be as direct as in a DC system.
The conclusion from the international comparison is that countries that lean toward private organised pension
systems seem to be performing better than public pension plans in terms of adequacy, sustainability and integrity.
THE ESSENCE OF STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
Stakeholder analysis may identify relevant groups who have an interest in the operations of a pension fund. The
original stakeholder theory was based on the idea that separation of commercial and ethical issues within a
1Mercer is a consultant on human resource and social security issues.
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company is not sustainable (Freeman et al., 2010: 3–5). By including other groups in addition to shareholders, a more
balanced approach to the strategic management of an organisation might be realised. Many deﬁnitions of stakeholder
exist (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Jensen, 2002; Bryson, 2004), but the classic deﬁnition by Freeman (1984: 46) is ‘any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’.
According to Freeman et al. (2010: 11–14), the organisational environment plays a vital role in achieving the
organisation’s goals, irrespective of the precise deﬁnition of that goal. Tullberg (2013) rephrases the stakeholder
issue as an issue of cooperation between partners. If conﬂict emerges, it would harm the organisation as a whole.
A major debate in stakeholder theory is how to identify relevant stakeholders. Here, two main schools of
thought emerge. In one school, stakeholders are limited to those who have power to directly inﬂuence the
organisation’s future (Mitchell et al., 1997: 857; Bryson, 2004: 22). This includes ﬁnanciers, employees,
customers, suppliers and the local community within which the organisation is operating (Freeman et al., 2010: 24).
In the other school, being affected by an organisation is sufﬁcient to qualify an individual as a stakeholder
(Bryson, 2004: 22) without including society as a whole (Phillips, 2003: 20). In this case, stakeholder status is
extended to government, competitors, interest groups and the media.
The stakeholder issue is as relevant in public service organisations such as health (e.g. Brugha and
Varvasovszky, 2000) and public administration (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 177–180; Bryson, 2004) as it is in
commercial organisations. Public administration scholars used stakeholder theory avant la lettre with an emphasis
on agenda setting and decision-making processes (refer to Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000, for an elaboration).
One line of analysis identiﬁes involvement and relevance of a particular policy within an organisation for each
of the stakeholder groups. Another line analyses policy development within time frames (Brugha and
Varvasovszky, 2000), which might lead to expectations on the development of support for or opposition to a
particular policy. Yet another angle is suggested by Bryson (2004), who developed a model that identiﬁed the
relevant topics for stakeholders and then analysed the relations between different groups of stakeholders and their
relative power within the policy ﬁeld at issue.
We were surprised not to ﬁnd explicit stakeholder analysis in the literature on pension plans. There are only
partial elements of such an analysis (Ambachtsheer, 2007: 59). Nonetheless, stakeholder analysis might be relevant
in pension plans. The stakeholders are all the people contributing to and beneﬁting from the state pensions, whether
they realize it or acknowledge the interests at stake.
One can distinguish four potential stakeholder interest conﬂicts, namely between the following:
1. retired and active plan members;
2. employers (organisations) and employees (trade unions);
3. government and pension funds; and
4. the board of pension funds and the participants in those funds.
Although we do not include the role of other stakeholders, such as the media, which can accelerate change by
publishing pension information, or national banks, which may act as supervisors on behalf of government, or lobby
Table 1. Average scores on Mercer indices for mandatory pension systems (our calculations based on Mercer (2013) and
OECD (2013); score range 0–100)
Mercer
GPI
Mercer
adequacy
Mercer
sustainability
Mercer
integrity
Countries
included
Public leaning systems (n= 11) 54.2 57.2 59.5 63.4 BR, DE, CA, CN, FR, ID, IN, JP,
KR, UK, USA
Private leaning systems (n= 8) 67.9 67.5 67.0 76.8 AU, CH, CL DK, MX, PL, NL, SE
Private DC (n= 6) 67.5 65.2 65.4 74.1 AU, CL DK, MX, PL,SE
Private DB (n= 2) 76.1 74.6 71.6 85.0 CH, NL
GPI, Global Pension Index; DC, deﬁned contribution; DB, deﬁned beneﬁt.
We have used the ISO 3166 list for internet country codes to list the countries.
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groups, which try to inﬂuence pension plans, the main conﬂicts of interests are, according to us, visible in the four
dyads aforementioned.
The interests of retired and active plan members can clash. Young and old people have different interests in how
pension funds invest their contributions. Retired participants want to secure their income levels with low-risk
investments. Active participants need excess return on their investments and are thus likely to prefer higher risk
levels. Some pension plans conducted surveys on aversion to risk as a means of identifying acceptable levels of
risk. (PNO-Actueel, 2011; Vollenbroek, 2013). It was found that, in general, participants suffer from ﬁnancial
illiteracy (Alessie et al., 2011; Gallery et al., 2011). Financial illiteracy particularly holds for women and lower
educated individuals, and the ﬁnancial crisis has not changed this (Alessie et al., 2011). Longevity is even less
comprehensible to plan members. However, a DB system implies a lifelong beneﬁt that can only be funded by
either excess returns or additional funding at the expense of active plan members. Given the demographic shifts,
costs of additional funding might be favoured by the retired members but judged too high by active plan members,
resulting in unsustainable DB plans (Frijns Committee, 2013: 12). This is one of the reasons why DB plans in the
UK are being closed to new participants (e.g. Grady, 2013).
The second grouping covers the conﬂicting interests of employers and employees. From a cost perspective, the level
of premiums and the resulting accrual level are an important issue. Both employers and employees have an interest in
stable levels of premiums, for either competition or purchasing power reasons. After the ﬁnancial crisis, this became
visible because the funding levels of pension funds decreased. Pension funds with insufﬁcient funding levels might in-
crease premiums to comply with regulations on recovery plans or decrease the pensions of the participants, which are
only directly observed by retired participants. Second, in cases of underfunding, the premium level might be set at a
cost-covering level including a surplus for recovery. In theory, this surplus is in the interest of all participants in a pension
plan, but the active participants suffer, generating a further conﬂict of interest between retired and active participants.
Employers’ objectives with respect to pension plans address manageable costs and competitive compensation
(Ambachtsheer, 2007: 59) because such plans affect their competitiveness and are seen as an important human re-
source tool (P&Oactueel, 2007). In company pension plans, direct involvement of all stakeholders is possible
(Ebbinghaus, 2007; Anderson, 2008; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009; Grady, 2013). In industry or insurance-based
plans, however, the individual company and its employees have no choice but to accept and sponsor the plan.
Employer’s organisations and trade unions, the so-called social partners, may negotiate on the setup of pension
plans. In particular, trade unions, whose members include elderly men (e.g. Belzer, 2010), are faced with debates
on the way forward. Many members and staff of the unions persist in maintaining the current retirement age. Fur-
thermore, a transfer of risks (Smith and MacLaren, 2011; Tretiakova and Yamada, 2011) from sponsor to partici-
pants – as is the case when a DB system is closed in favour of a DC system – may be difﬁcult to accept. Second,
social partners may take important positions in the governance of pension funds. In many funds, representatives of
trade unions and employer organisations are members of the pension fund board. In addition to wage negotiations,
governing and deciding pension plans are two of the core businesses for trade unions (Marier, 2012). An issue in
this regard is that labour relations are changing. Lifelong employment in one company is not the standard anymore.
Häuserman (2010: 226) refers to the transition to a post-industrial society, whereas pension plans are still set up on
the basis of single-income lifelong careers. This problem directly affects the legitimacy of organized labour in
western countries with increased numbers of self-employed, ﬂex workers and women in the labour market who
do not feel represented by trade unions (Belzer, 2010). This increases the observed mismatch between individuals’
requirements and the present DB setup of many second-pillar plans (Frijns Committee, 2013: 19). In a proposal by
youth organisations, a compulsory form of DC plan might mitigate this mismatch (Nieuwpensioenstelsel.nl, n.d.)
The third dimension refers to political interaction with pension funds, that is, the laws, regulations and the controls
of the government on the pension funds. At the political level, pension reform is an issue to be solved preferably in
cooperation with social partners, not only to prevent blockades in the realisation of policy changes (Marier, 2012:
324; Ebbinghaus, 2011: 317) but also to reduce the possible electoral impact of decisions (Ebbinghaus, 2011). In
addition, the political level sets the framework for oversight as well as ﬁscal facilitation of pension savings.
The fourth dimension refers to the extent participants can inﬂuence decisions of the boards of privately
organised pension funds. The key task of a pension fund board is to execute the pension plan. Such boards can
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be held accountable for the operational continuity of the fund at different levels including investment returns,
liquidity, organisational continuity, adequate administration, outsourcing and reasonable costs as well as for the
distribution of excess or shortfall of returns among its participants. This is often realised by outsourcing activities
to one or more specialised service providers. In the latter case, the board organises a form of checks and balances
within the system of pension provision. This requires adequate skills and competencies among board members, an
issue that is high on the agenda of many a supervisor.
Hence, there are many stakeholders involved in a pension system and many potential conﬂicts. A speciﬁc
problem for the area of pension funds is that not all stakeholders are knowledgeable about the speciﬁcs involved
in policy changes. Furthermore, not all have equal inﬂuence in the governance structure of pension funds. This
is indicative of the dilemmas involved, which we address at the end of this article.
THE THREE-PILLAR PENSION SYSTEM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ITS PROBLEMS
General information about pension systems in different OECD countries is useful because many countries face sim-
ilar problems from the ageing of society, and the effects of the stock market crash where many pension funds had
invested their premiums. An in-depth analysis of the problems in one country and the solutions sought for these
problems might provide better insight into what is at stake. In this section, we present the outcomes of an analysis
on the Netherlands. We begin with a concise overview of the pension system in the Netherlands, and we follow up
with a summary of the main challenges it faces and the solutions sought.
Characteristics of the Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system is a three-pillar system in which state, labour market and private components co-exist.
According to the OECD study (2013: 159), some 63% of mandatory pension income in the Netherlands is
generated from private sources. Early retirement programs still exist, but they will end by 2015, and we do not
address them here. In the Netherlands, informal support by families and neighbours is not regarded as part of
the pension system.
The ﬁrst pillar2 consists of the state pension, which is a basic provision for all people beyond 65 years. First-
pillar pensions in the Netherlands are not means tested like in Denmark (Ploug, 2003:73). When the ﬁrst pillar
was created in the 1950s, the population over 65 years in most developed countries was slightly above 10%.
One of the problems in ﬁnancing this pension is that nowadays, almost a quarter of the population in OECD
countries is over 65 years (van Nimwegen and van Praag, 2012). Furthermore, the life expectancy of people
reaching the pension age was, at the end of the 1950s, 11 years (for men) and 13 years (for women), whereas now-
adays, life expectancy is 21 years (for women) and 17 years (for men) (van Nimwegen and van Praag, 2012). So,
more people beneﬁt for a longer period, making this pension very costly. This problem is becoming more serious,
because it is based on tax funding on a PAYGO basis. The declining birth rate in developed countries to less than
two children per family has made this system expensive for the population at large. Hence, the problems in the ﬁrst-
pillar pensions are mainly caused by a combination of demographic trends.
Second-pillar plans existed long before ﬁrst-pillar plans were created. Companies started pension plans in the early
1900s. These plans gradually transferred to the present industry wide or company plans in which trade unions and em-
ployers decided upon the setup of the second-pillar pension plan, within the boundaries of the legal framework
established by government. In an industry plan, all companies subject to the relevant labour agreement are compulsory
participants in the industry pension plan. The majority of second-pillar Dutch pension plans are either industry-wide
pension plans (e.g. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (ABP) for civil servants) or company pension plans (e.g. Shell
pension fund), and some 90% of the labour force participates in Dutch second-pillar plans (Anderson, 2008: 14).
The ﬁrst and second pillars experience common problems. First, premiums are not differentiated, despite higher life
expectancy, for instance, of wealthy people and women. Second, everyone beneﬁts when reaching the age of 65 years,
2By 2012, some €31 billion (5% of GDP) was paid on behalf of the ﬁrst pillar in the Netherlands.
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whereas one starts to pay as soon as one starts to work. The demographic problems and these characteristics of the
pillars results in conﬂict between generations because younger people are burdened with higher contributions, whereas
older people see their pensions frozen instead of indexed to inﬂation.
From a governance perspective, second-pillar plans are separate legal entities, independent from government and
individual companies. The independent status of the pension fund involved assures that accrued assets and liabilities
of the pension plan are separated from the company’s balance sheets. Therefore, bankruptcy does not immediately
threaten the continuity of the pension fund. The system is monitored by independent supervising institutions.
The default Dutch second-pillar plan is characterised by a nominal DB system. Efforts to change the system to a
system with better inﬂation compensation assurance are pending (Frijns Committee, 2010; Kortleve, 2013). Retired
participants in particular contest the proposed changes because they prefer certainty over risk and do not want to
face the risk of a nominal beneﬁt cut that cannot be excluded in the proposed system. International developments
for companies with respect to accounting; examples from other countries, such as Denmark and Australia (Ploug,
2003), and labour market developments within the Netherlands show a tendency toward future DC systems. Youth
branches of political parties have proposed setting up a DC-based system with risk sharing on longevity. The latter
would be realised by leaving proﬁts and losses on expected longevity within the system rather than paying out the
remainder of the annuity to heirs (Nieuwpensioenstelsel.nl, n.d.).
We only brieﬂy address the third and fourth pillars. The third pillar is meant for those who cannot make
sufﬁcient savings in second-pillar plans. This primarily concerns entrepreneurs and the self-employed. Until
recently, ﬁscal packages allowed for saving in the third pillar, but banks and insurance companies took advantage
by introducing high costs for such plans at the expense of individual participants. Because of the proﬁt orientation
of banks and insurance companies, third-pillar plans are too costly (OECD, 2013: 10). This, combined with abuse
by some providers has reduced popularity of third-pillar savings substantially.
A fourth pillar does exist, but is – at least in the public opinion – not part of old-age-related savings. A recent
report by the ministry of Finance (Ministerie van Financiën, 2013: 24) shows that the cohorts 55–65 and
65–75 years old have more than twice the level of assets as the adjacent cohorts. Ideas for using these assets are
not supported, and it is not hard to ﬁnd proposals to transfer the assets to children for example. Even the govern-
ment is supporting such transfers by facilitating transfer of accrued assets to children under the condition that it is
used to buy a house.
In short, the Dutch pension system is a combination of a public ﬁrst-pillar PAYGO, a second-pillar employee-based
private DB system, with additions in third-pillar and fourth-pillar pension plans. This makes the Dutch case relevant in
every aspect.
Recent changes in the Dutch pension system
Changing the pension system has proved to be burdensome. Political efforts to change the ﬁrst-pillar system were
discussed in the early 1990s but failed on at least two occasions (De Beer, 2009). It made politicians cautious about
proposing changes in the ﬁrst-pillar pension plan. The Global Financial Crisis and the euro-crisis created the policy
window for change (cf. Kingdon, 1995: 166). The pension system as a whole ran into a crisis, and a difﬁcult debate
in 2011 resulted in a national pension agreement signed off by Cabinet, trade unions and employers. This
agreement resulted in a gradual increase in the ﬁrst-pillar retirement age to 67 years in 2023. From a stakeholder
perspective, it can be claimed that the 2012 election at least showed acceptance for this change.
Problems in the second-pillar plans3 included sustainability issues, which were mainly solved by changing to an
average-wage DB system rather than a ﬁnal-wage DB system, mergers and liquidations of pension funds,4 reducing
the number by more than half in some 10 years to less than 400 by the end of 2012 (Bikker, 2013: 7; DNB, 2013)
and stricter solvency rules including market valuation of liabilities. Although solvency rules are relatively
3Assets under management by end 2012 in second-pillar plans were some 1 trillion or 150% GDP with a close to 100% funding level. The ﬁve
largest pension plans manage more than 500 billion assets.
4Liquidation could be triggered not only by ﬁnancial non-performance but also for reasons of not being able to meet the current governance
requirements anymore. In most cases, liquidation implies transfer to an insurance company.
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unimportant from a governance perspective, it is one of the reasons for the current debate on the sustainability of
pension plans given the low interest rates. Furthermore, changes were made to adjust governance issues such as
inﬂuence of participants (Parliament, 2005: 3) and changes in the labour market.
From 2008 onward, pension funds were hit by two factors driving funding ratios in many cases below required
levels. The ﬁrst factor is the economic one, related to the stock market crash and low interest rate levels as a result
of central banks’ interventions to support economies. The other factor has an actuarial background. As of 2007,
longevity was no longer calculated not only on historic data but also on expected improvements in life expectancy
because of medical innovations and individuals’ behaviour. In 2010, the revised model led to an increase of
longevity of around 1 year (Actuarieel Genootschap, 2010: 13), which was incorporated into pension funds’ liabilities.
Before the Global Financial Crisis, the average funding ratio of Dutch pension funds was some 140% of
liabilities (DNB, 2012). At the end of 2008, funding levels had dropped to on average just below 100%, and in
extreme cases, to around 80%. This was the wakeup call for participants, and a huge debate on the sustainability
of the Dutch system began. With pressure from within the industry, the trade unions and political parties, the
political system intervened at several stages to postpone the most painful and direct measure of forcing pension
plans to announce beneﬁt cuts. In the end, beneﬁt cuts could not be avoided and were implemented by Spring
2013, affecting some 5.3 million participants from a total of 16.9 million participants.
Table 2 provides a summary of the most relevant changes in the last decade. According to the OECD, only
minor changes in pension plans are evident in the Netherlands, and they did very little to resolve issues such as
adequacy and ﬁnancial sustainability (OECD, 2013: 25).
A stakeholder analysis of the changes in the pension system
How do these changes in the system relate to the interests and involvement of stakeholders? Given the possible
conﬂicts, has the governance structure in the Dutch pension system changed? Table 3 provides an overview of
key changes related to stakeholder issues.
Table 2. Major changes in the Dutch pension system since 2000
Problem Solution
First-pillar issues
Post crisis
1. Retiring baby boomers 1. Gradual increasing the retirement age to 67
by 2023
2. Longevity 2. 2024 onward, systematic additional increase
retirement age
Second-pillar issues
Pre-crisis
1. Cost level of ﬁnal-wage DB system 1. Shift towards average-wage DB system
2. Governance issues small second-pillar plans 2. Liquidation and mergers of second-pillar plans
3. Weak accounting and solvency standards 3. Market-based accounting + higher solvency
standards
Second-pillar issues
Post crisis
1. Average accrual generates generation conﬂict 1. Not solved yet
2. Funding below 100% 2a. Short term:
Relaxing solvency rules temporarily
Limiting beneﬁt cuts when needed to 7% maximum.
Adjusted liability calculation rules based on ultimate
forward rate
Beneﬁt cuts where needed
2b. Long run:
New setup based on increased retirement age
including preference on indexation. Implicit debate
on replacement rate in political system
3. Longevity increase 3. Incorporated in liabilities and funding
4. Risk distribution in DB system unclear 4. Partly: new setup, but tendency to DC
5. Loss of conﬁdence, general and on size
and scale of plans
5. Focus on transparency and information
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At ﬁrst sight, it seems that the governance structure of pension funds was balanced in that it emphasised
participation of beneﬁciaries as well as the need to have competent members in pension fund boards and to make those
boards accountable. However, in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, some cases of mismanagement arose, and
politicians started to question how pension plans were actually run. According to them, the increased complexity of
investments and decision making in the pension industry required a change from a paternalistic structure toward a
more transparent, democratic and expertise-based governance structure (Frijns Committee, 2010: 4). This called for
changes that gave more power to pension fund beneﬁciaries. However, several boundary conditions allowed for
limited changes in the inﬂuence of beneﬁciaries.
The distribution of powers between the institutions of a pension plan and social partners deciding upon the
pension plan remains complex. In the revised legislation, consent concerning any changes to the fundamental setup
of a plan has to be achieved. First, consent is required between employer and trade unions negotiating on labour
contracts. Second, within the company, the workers council has a right of consent if the continuity of the fund is
under discussion. Finally, the pension board has to decide whether a proposed pension plan is feasible from the
perspective of the ﬁnancial setup and whether it can be implemented from an operational perspective.
At the individual level, participants still lack substantial inﬂuence. They are merely to be informed after the
decisions have been made. The question is whether this is sustainable. One sees a generational conﬂict appearing
in which, particularly, younger people are trying to organise themselves to inﬂuence the debate on the future of the
present pension plans. Retired participants were already more organised but spoke out more clearly as well. The
question is whether their role can stay as minimal as it is, given the interests at stake.
The 2007 pension law introduced external supervision of communication by pension funds. This was a stimulus
to provide adequate information to participants in the plan. Two changes were implemented. First, a standard
annual overview of (future) pension beneﬁts. This means that participants are able to assess (future) pension
beneﬁts from their pension plan. Second, a national register fromwhich information on all ﬁrst-pillar and second-pillar
(future) pension beneﬁts can be retrieved was developed. Speciﬁcally, the national register was a success. In the ﬁrst
2weeks of operations, over a million people consulted the register, and the total visits in 2011 and 2012 reached over
ﬁve million (Pensioenregister, 2013). The standard annual overview was less successful. This may have been caused
Table 3. Key changes in the system in relation to Stakeholder issues
Stakeholder issues Key changes
Participants Generation conﬂict Surveys on risk appetite
Financial illiteracy Standardised annual overview of entitlements per plan
Internet application providing summary of all ﬁrst-pillar
and second-pillar entitlements
Longevity Political decisions on higher retirement age (67) accepted
but no inﬂuence on contents of second-pillar plans
Employers/employees Stability of premiums 2008: increase due to underfunding
2014 onwards lower cost based on new ﬁscal package
Decide upon plan Implementation of higher retirement age in plan: work in progress
In company funds consent by workers council if continuity
of plan is at stake
Changes in labour market None
Politicians Sustainability Pension agreement with social partners
Increased retirement age in the ﬁrst and second pillars
A more restrictive ﬁscal package
Oversight Regulation on competences of board members
Accounting and funding level standards not solved yet
Boards Operational continuity Mergers and liquidations
Trend to professionalization
Legitimacy Board members representing retired participants required
Modernisation of internal oversight
Stakeholders propose rather than appoint board members
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by problems in ﬁnding an indicator on the quality of a pension plan in terms of purchasing power and risk.5 Both
improvements relate to ﬁnancial planning tools, and they do not allow, for example, changes in individual
investment preferences.
Dutch second-pillar pension plans manage billions of euros on behalf of their participants. The accumulated
assets are invested all over the world in various ﬁnancial instruments. Historically, both industry and company
pension plans were managed by people who do not necessarily have the expertise to cope with all the issues on
investments and risks in a plan. In industry pension funds, the problem was partially covered. Appointed representa-
tives were required to have at least some knowledge on issues such as pension arrangements and legislation and some
knowledge on investments. In company pension plans, ﬁnding such knowledge is more challenging particularly, but
not only, for the board members appointed by employees. In many smaller company pension plans, the employer
appoints the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer or the head of the human resource department as board member in the pension
fund, assuring some knowledge.
After an 8-year discussion, the 2007 pension law included a requirement on the ex ante assessment of candidate
board members. The assessment included eight areas of expertise: governing, legislation, types of pension plans,
investment management, ﬁnancial management, actuarial expertise, internal controls and, last but not least,
communication. Since 2007, the supervisor gradually intensiﬁed its role in such assessments. In addition to looking
at the individual expertise of potential board members, it reviewed the expertise of the board as a whole. Pension
plans had to prove that on all required ﬁelds of expertise, at least two board members met the standards as set by the
supervisor. The debate on expertise and integrity gained momentum in 2010 when the pension supervisor stated
that the number of Dutch pension plans should decline from some 600 to 100 for reasons of expertise and
governing power (Gotink, 2010).
As to the inﬂuence of retired participants, as early as the late 1990s, debates on their role in second-pillar plans
began taking place, but none of the plans were effective. The initial idea was to make a covenant between social
partners and organisations of pensioners to include pensioners in the governance system of pension plans. In
2002 and 2007, members of the Parliament proposed draft laws to formalise the inﬂuence of pensioners in
second-pillar plans. The third attempt started in 2008. It proposed that employees and pensioners would be proportionally
represented on the board of a pension fund according to the number of participants of each group in the pension
plan. Ofﬁcially, the law is effective as of 1 July 2013. However, it will not be implemented because a more
fundamental change in the pension funds’ governance structure overrules this law. The representation issue does
not solve the sustainability issues raised by younger generations and broader developments in the labour market.
The fundamental revision of the governance structure was partially driven by the supervisor’s claims that
pension plans should be governed like large ﬁnancial institutions. The new legislation, effective from July 2014,
includes ﬁve key changes in pension funds’ governance structure.
The ﬁrst change concerns the setup of the pension board. It allows for several options based on the traditional
boards and a fully independent board. The existing pension boards may choose an option that best ﬁts their
purposes. Ideally, all stakeholders will subsequently be involved.
The second change concerns the distribution of powers within the board. Pensioners will be represented in
pension boards unconditionally, but their inﬂuence will be limited to a maximum of 25% of the seats, unless the
board as a whole decides otherwise. It is believed that this will protect employers from having a minority position
and thus contribute to sustainable governance of the fund (Parliament, 2012: 8).
The third change is related to internal supervision. Under the new law, industry pension funds are required to
create an internal (two-tier) supervisory board, but the supervisory board has limited powers and is not allowed
to appoint or dismiss the operational board members.
In the 2008 pension law, the participants’ council was required to advise the pension board prior to key
decisions. This role is now considered obsolete because the board includes representatives of all three main
stakeholder groups. The co-governance role of the participants council is replaced by the accountability body,
having basically an ex post rather than an ex ante advisory role.
5The indicator is called ‘indexation label’ and was required until early 2011.
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The ﬁfth change concerns the appointment of board members. Under current law, expertise on pensions is a
requirement for board members. In practice, this implies that board members could be assessed by the system
supervisor after their appointment to the board. If necessary, they are required to take courses on pension issues.
The new law introduces three changes. In addition to technical knowledge, board members must have the relevant
skills and professional attitude to manage, and they must have these abilities before being appointed. These
changes imply that the board has to assess ex ante whether a candidate ﬁts the proﬁle. As a result, the role of
stakeholders is reduced to selecting and proposing candidates for board positions.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE FOR LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
In this article, we investigated changing stakeholder involvement in pension plans. We presented the essence of a
stakeholder analysis and applied this to stakeholders in pension plans. Second, we analysed the ﬁve pillars that form
the basis of pension plans and the merits of the dominance of these pillars in OECD countries. Third, we presented a
case study on the pension system and the changes in one of the OECD countries, namely, the Netherlands.
The stakeholder analysis proved useful in analysing the problems, interests and changes in pension systems. It
enabled us to identify the conﬂicts of interests, the varying inﬂuence of different stakeholders and the implications
of consequent changes in pension systems.
The international comparison indicated that pension systems with substantial private elements in the second
pillar are superior to pension systems, which are basically public. Of course, isomorphism is no guarantee for
success, and it might be helpful to ﬁnd out whether implementation of successful pension systems can be easily
and effectively transferred internationally. Building up a second-pillar system can be hard if immediate effects
are expected (Moss, 2013).
Looking more closely at the actual changes in the governance structure of Dutch pension funds, we determined
that the inﬂuence of retired and active participants in the pension funds always has been minimal and, despite the
new laws, continues to be minimal. Changes are more a form of window dressing than fundamental, but there has
been an increase in accountability and transparency of pension boards’ decision making. After boards make their
decisions, they have to publish their plans and inform their members. However, this only partially addresses the prob-
lem of the stakeholders and their potential mutual conﬂicts. Indeed, in the decision-making process, the balance seems
to have shifted from representing conﬂicting interests toward prioritizing expertise among the decision makers in the
pension fund boards. Knowledge, skills and a professional attitude are deemed more important than a representation of
interests. The inclusion of representatives of all the mentioned conﬂicting interests groups in pension boards, in
addition to sufﬁcient members having the necessary expertise, might be beneﬁcial for all involved.
More generally, there is a trend toward more accountability and transparency, but not toward more stakeholder
empowerment. This seems unsustainable, especially given growing intergenerational conﬂicts and the conﬂict of
interest between retired and working people. Such conﬂicts of interest, which have been latent up to now, require
a democratic, that is, political intervention, and cannot be remedied by the increasingly technocratic boards. If such
intervention is not realized in a timely manner, pressure to move towards individual DC plans will increase and
may threaten the system as a whole. Politicians can solve the reverse solidarity from low to high incomes by
capping income levels in second-pillar plans without intervening in the fundamentals of the system.
Creating second-pillar pension plans requires bottom–up support from stakeholder organisations for two
reasons. One is that it makes old age savings acceptable for individual participants. The other is that organized
stakeholder power may prevent politicians from short-term motivation to intervene in the pension system of a
country, as what happened in Hungary (as pointed elsewhere in this journal) or Poland and even recently in the
Czech Republic, despite positive comments on recent reforms in that country (Sourbes, 2011; Batty and
Hailichova, 2012; Krzyzack, 2014). In these cases, the change of a political regime is a threat to the continuity
of a pensions system, so consensus and trust must be at the core of the pension system as a whole. In the Dutch case,
this was achieved by creating non-commercial independent institutions based on bottom–up initiatives but
acknowledged by the political system as a whole. Business organisations have contributed to this from a perspective
of good personnel management (ensuring good information and advice to individual employees) and from the
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perspective of sustainable ﬁnancing ensuring that second-pillar pensions are seen as a form of postponed wages and
part of employees’ remuneration rather than as an additional cost component.
Although we did not address independence in depth in this article, we would argue that because only commercial
ﬁnancial institutions will have relevant expertise in many cases, the business model of a second-pillar plan should
minimise incentives for these institutions to sell their own investment products rather than looking for the best
investment solution in the market, which is in the interest of the pension plan. Elements contributing to reduced
incentives may include strong focus on cost transparency, limiting the role of the institution to that of a ﬁduciary that
is not cross-selling its own asset management products and independent performance measurement and control.
Literature on developing countries provides examples of other industries where these bottom–up initiatives are
successful. First, Kim (2011) refers to forms of institutionalised citizen involvement in policy processes. In the
examples given, organisations rather than individuals take the role of countervailing powers to a service provider.
One can imagine that these organisations can play a role in the governance structure of pension systems as well, be
it in a supervisory board or an accountability body. These types of groups may prove helpful in overcoming
political polarisation on pensions as well. Second, Parkinson (2009) refers to bottom–up organisations by informa-
tion sharing through ﬁrst users to other participants in the same stakeholder group, which may create a form of
legitimacy for a program.
Demographics and labour market developments seem to indicate that funded DB systems are no longer sustainable.
If a trend towards DC is developing, the essential difference between second-pillar and third-pillar systems is the
mandatory character of the second-pillar system. There might be very good reasons to include some forms of risk
sharing in a second-pillar system, whereas the commercially driven third pillar does not have these characteristics.
If risk sharing is an issue, it should be very clear in the setup of a plan and communicated or debated with
participants both beforehand and continuously. Labour organisations, workers councils in companies that are less
unionised and key persons in groups (Parkinson, 2009) can play a role in information provision and consultation
about the risk-sharing arrangements. Among elements to be addressed are generation-based investment proﬁles,
which help to not only mitigate ﬁnancial illiteracy but also avoid intergenerational conﬂicts of interests, sharing
of longevity risks given an ex ante deﬁned pay-out period and sharing accrual risks between both old and young
generations as well as groups with expected relatively long and relatively short labour market participation.
Finally, we would make three general take away points for setting up second-pillar pension systems. First, if a
plan is set up, assure that if it is based on solidarity (or risk sharing), the nature of the plan is fully transparent to
participants. Second, the issue of longevity is an overarching issue in any pension system, however organised.
People are living longer, which means that to have a sustainable pension system, regular adjustments for life
expectancy are needed. Third, information and planning tools can help individuals ﬁnd out the level of expected
pensions. This has been an attractive tool in the Netherlands, helping to manage expectations. However, they are
not enough to secure the interests of stakeholders.
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